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 How Trade Politics Affect Invasive Species Control 
Michael Margolis and Jason F. Shogren 
Abstract 
Trade has become the main mode of transport for many invasive species including diseases and 
agricultural pests. Most species are brought to their new homes unintentionally, which constitute a market 
failure rooted in international trade. Unless it is practical to drive invasion risk to zero, the external costs 
may justify a tariff. In this paper we analyze the political process likely to govern the formation of tariffs 
so justified, using a straightforward incorporation of an invasive species externality into Grossman and 
Helpman’s well-known political economy model. We show our measure of disguised protectionism—the 
gap between the optimal tariff and that set in the equilibrium of the political economy game—is equal to 
the tariff that would be set if there were no invasive species and no international disciplines on trade 
policy. The informational needs required to distinguish disguised protectionism from legitimate public-
goods protection are formidable. 
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 How Trade Politics Affect Invasive Species Control 
Michael Margolis and Jason F. Shogren∗ 
1. Introduction 
As humans traverse the globe more swiftly, we have become the main mode of 
transportation for other species. One estimate suggests that 50,000 nonnative species now live in 
just the United States (see Pimentel et al. 2000). Most creatures introduced into alien 
environments die without a trace, and some become valued crops or ornaments. But some 
invasive species are diseases, some are agricultural pests, and some become major threats to the 
ecosystems. People only now are beginning to appreciate the scope and severity of the problems 
posed by this last class. Exotic species are the second most commonly cited cause of extinction 
threats (after land-use changes) and a source of threats to water quality, navigability, and other 
ecosystem services (OTA 1993; Sandlund et al. 1999). At present, species that have not yet been 
shown to cause problems can be freely imported into most countries. Most species, however, are 
brought to their new homes unintentionally in ballast water, packing material, and cargo (Jenkins 
1996). The resulting invasions constitute a market failure rooted in international trade. 
Economists generally agree that market failures should be corrected as close as possible 
to their source. Consider pollution from hog farming for example. While pollution could be 
alleviated by subsidizing some combination of other activities to attract labor and machinery 
away from hog-farms, most economists agree that a tax on hog farmers is better, and a tax  
that varies with level of emissions—a Pigovian tax—is ideal. Similarly, although the theory of 
the second best implies that trade restrictions may improve national welfare if there is any 
domestic market failure, economists almost always respond by urging a solution more targeted to 
the failure.  
Invasive species are among a relatively small group of market failures the source of 
which is trade itself (although it is never explicitly discussed in Copeland and Taylor’s 2003 
book on trade and the environment). Other examples include pollution from ships and the 
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opportunity for smuggling of contraband materials or military (i.e., terrorist) personnel. In these 
cases reducing trade is the solution closest to the source of the failure, unless it is possible to 
monitor the harmful activity itself. That might be possible for noxious pollution from ships, but 
for invasive species it is prohibitively costly. One can search for the species and remove them 
when found; but unless it is optimal to search with such intensity that invasion risk is driven to 
zero, an external cost to trade still exists that would seem to call for some policy such as a tax 
(McAusland and Costello, 2002). 
To an idealized social planner, this presents no great challenge—but an idealized social 
planner has little need to engage in international trade negotiation to begin with. The central 
accomplishment of those negotiations has been to rid participating countries of policies that were 
contrary to the interest of their own citizenry, but that emerge due to the fundamental asymmetry 
of trade politics—producers count more than consumers. Even in the best-functioning 
democracy, the benefits of trade barriers accrue to small groups of producers, while the costs are 
spread across a large group of consumers. It is easier to push the costs on diffuse consumers who 
have less incentive to form a group to fight for free trade. Producers use protectionism as a way 
to keep prices high to extract consumer surplus from consumers. This fundamental asymmetry of 
trade politics is mitigated by international rules that prohibit policies discriminating against 
foreign goods, but such rules are inappropriate for market failures in which it is the transport of 
the goods itself that does the harm. 
Herein we present a straightforward incorporation of an invasive species externality in 
trade into the predominant model of the political economy of tariff formation (Grossman and 
Helpman 1994). The result is sharp—if countries are freely setting tariffs, the external damage is 
added to the tariff that would be chosen to redistribute income in the absence of the externality. 
While the simplicity of this argument is due in part to assumptions made for computational 
convenience, the result nonetheless serves to illustrate the interaction of public and private 
interest in the formation of a trade-environment policy. The result also indicates the impossibility 
of distinguishing legitimate public-goods protection from protectionism without full knowledge 
of the public-goods value.1   
 
                                                 
1 In a companion piece, we discuss more complex policy options (see Margolis and Shogren 2004). 
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2. Background 
We begin by providing background on free trade and invasive species management to 
help motivate our model. In the United States, regulators at the Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service (APHIS) routinely scrutinize new trade flows to determine the danger of 
known agricultural pathogens, refusing permission or requiring treatments if that danger is great. 
Similar policies towards invasive species—those that damage natural systems rather than 
agriculture—have been less common, but are becoming more so. It is unclear at present what it 
takes to prevent such policies from being overturned in trade disputes. Knowing when to expect 
this problem is of obvious value. To some extent, this is a legal question, a matter of how the 
trade laws will be read. But actual trade disputes result from both conflict between policies and 
trade agreement obligations and from trade-partner incentives to enforce those obligations. It 
would be beneficial to delineate the economic circumstances under which potential disputes can 
be expected to become actual disputes. As new trade agreements are reached, it is likely that 
dispute settlement procedures will be modified. Insight into the efficiency properties of 
alternative arrangements will be useful to help form negotiating positions resulting in agreements 
that make appropriate trade-offs between the gains from trade and losses due to invasive species. 
U.S. regulators are limited by two trade institutions: the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Each has its own rules, 
employing different evaluations of the costs and benefits of regulatory policies and the scientific 
basis for risk analysis. We will consider the current state of affairs for each in turn. The 
fundamental constraint the WTO legal framework imposes on national policymaking is the 
principle of national treatment specified in Article III, which requires importing countries to treat 
foreign goods the same way they treat “like” domestic goods. This is a straightforward 
requirement if imported goods are identical to something produced domestically, but usually 
something distinct exists about the imports that allows for varying interpretation about whether 
importers are suffering discrimination. There is therefore a set of “General Exceptions” (Article 
XX)—listed purposes for which measures may treat imports differently, unless they are deemed 
to be “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions 
prevail” or “disguised restriction on international trade.”  These exceptions include measures 
“necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health” (XX(b)) and those “relating to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources” (XX(g)). 
These exceptions would appear to give importers little recourse if their product is banned 
with the express purpose of removing invasive species that threaten environmental quality or 
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food safety. By the time the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was last 
renegotiated (the Uruguay Round 1986–1993), several disputes over the use of Article XX 
remained unresolved, and a consensus had emerged among trade negotiators that the existing 
legal structure was incapable of preventing trade disruption due to technical restrictions (Roberts 
2000).  
The result is embodied in two agreements that are among the founding documents of the 
WTO: the agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and the agreement on 
technical barriers to trade (TBT). The SPS agreement deals with more specific issues of human, 
animal, and plant health and lays out more detailed rules for coordinating policies. The TBT 
agreement establishes general principles for international coordination of product regulations 
across countries and sets criteria for imposing potentially discriminatory technical standards and 
regulations on imports.  
In the SPS Agreement, the main discipline is the requirement that national policies be 
based on a risk assessment to the extent that they depart from internationally agreed-upon 
standards. This implies some scientific evidence must exist that a measure actually results in 
higher level of protection against some hazard than that afforded by international standards. 
There is no limit to the level of protection a nation may seek—a “zero risk” has been explicitly 
recognized as an acceptable goal. Nations may also adopt measures provisionally, while a risk 
assessment is being carried out.  
What constitutes a risk assessment appears to vary depending on just what is at risk. 
According to Annex A of the agreement (“Definitions”), an assessment for food safety must be 
“the evaluation of the potential for adverse affects on human or animal health,” while for the risk 
of disease or pest what is required is “the evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or 
spread.”  This has been interpreted to mean that a measure to prevent the entry of disease or pest 
must include some estimate of the probability the disease or pest would become established in 
the importing country in the absence of the measure under challenge and another estimate that 
the probability is reduced in the presence of the measure. In contrast, for a food safety measure, 
it is sufficient to show that some actual danger exists (Pauwelyn 1999). In all cases, however, a 
risk assessment must be specific. A separate assessment is needed for each substance. And if a 
region within a country can be shown to be free of a pest, imports from that region must be 
allowed even if contamination of other regions precludes certification of the whole country. 
The SPS Agreement also contains various provisions (i.e., Articles 5, 7, and 9) to 
encourage full disclosure of scientific information and to promote symmetry of information 
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among Members. Article 5 requires a Member to avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in 
the levels of protection it deems appropriate, if such distinctions discriminate between imported 
and domestic products or create a disguised trade barrier. But it remains unclear what constitutes 
an unjustifiable distinction in levels of protection. It may be consistent with public preferences to 
tolerate different levels of protection against different health risks because some health outcomes 
are more socially salient than others (e.g., childhood diseases). Appropriate levels of protection 
may also vary due to the feasibility of mitigation measures or the magnitude of the societal 
benefits balanced against the risks. 
The TBT Agreement applies to any rule requiring or prohibiting specific characteristics 
of a product, except for those that are covered by the SPS Agreement. In general, it is easier to 
defend a regulation if it can be brought under the TBT rather than the SPS. The transparency and 
nondiscrimination features of the two agreements are almost the same. The major difference is 
that an SPS measure must be backed by scientific evidence that it advances its goal, and the 
measure can be applied only to the extent necessary to achieve the proclaimed level of risk 
reduction. Measures subject to the TBT agreement do not, as a rule, have any equally verifiable 
purpose, so there is no equivalent requirement for scientific assessment (WTO 1998). 
The TBT also covers measures related to packaging and labeling. As a rule, the TBT does 
not permit importing countries to place restrictions on how products are made, or “Process and 
Production Methods” (PPMs). Rather, standards must be written in terms of product 
characteristics that can be measured at the border. Based on position papers circulated by 
national delegations to the WTO, labeling requirements appear likely to emerge as an exception 
to the rule against PPM regulation, but this has not yet been codified in any formal agreement or, 
as far as we know, tested in case law.  
The basic allocation of the burden of proof by WTO panels and appellate bodies dates 
from the earliest GATT panel practices (c. 1954). First, the exporting nation bears the burden of 
showing a violation of the national treatment principle—that is, of showing an imported good is 
like a domestically produced good and that it is being treated differently. Once this is 
established, the burden shifts to the importing nation to prove the challenged measure falls 
within the scope of Article XX. This requires the importing nation to show that the policy is 
aimed at one of the listed purposes, that it is necessary for the fulfillment of that purpose, and 
that it has not been applied arbitrarily or in such a manner as to constitute a disguised trade 
barrier (Pauwelyn 1998). 
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The burden of proof allocation has some distinct features in SPS cases, established in the 
dispute between the European Community (defendant) and the United States and Canada 
(complainants) over the use of growth hormones to raise beef cattle. There are still two phases, 
with the burden shifting from the exporting country in the first to the importing country in the 
second. But in SPS cases there is no difference between phases in what has to be proven. The 
complainant must make a prima facie case that the measure to which it objects is inconsistent 
with some provision of the SPS agreement; once that case is made, the defendant bears the 
burden to “counter or refute the claimed inconsistency” (Pauwelyn 1998). 
The SPS requirement that there be “scientific” evidence appears to give official 
recognition to conventional confidence intervals as a standard of proof. Formally, panels 
commission independent experts to review the scientific evidence submitted in defense of an 
SPS measure and pronounce on whether there is or is not evidence that the measure protects the 
health of humans, other animals, or plants. Explicitly, they do not ask anything about how much 
protection is afforded—only whether scientists can verify that there is some. This is perhaps the 
key feature of the current system. It means that investment in larger scale studies should always 
be expected ex ante to increase the probability that a contested measure will be upheld. And it 
means that as knowledge accumulates, and we become more able to detect impurities and to 
ascribe ecosystem changes to biological invasion, we face a growing bias against trade.  
The interpretation of the word “necessary” in the definitions of the general exceptions in 
GATT Article XX (i.e., a measure falls under the exception if “necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health”) also continues to evolve. If a measure were only deemed 
necessary when no other measure—regardless of cost—could achieve the proclaimed goal, the 
exception could be rendered meaningless. Early interpretation deemed a measure necessary if 
there was no less trade restrictive way to achieve the goal, but now even this is viewed as too 
narrow: what if there were a way that were a tiny bit less trade restrictive but imposed huge 
administrative costs? Current interpretation is somewhat loosely referred to as “a less-trade 
restrictive [approach], supplemented with a proportionality test” (WTO 2002). That is, if a 
measure is more trade restrictive than an alternative, it must have some compensating virtue of 
comparable magnitude. 
As compared with the WTO, NAFTA allows national governments more latitude over 
their technical standards and SPS measures. This is made clear by three features of the 
agreement. First, the burden of proof in arbitration over SPS or TBT measures is assigned to the 
plaintiff, or the party challenging the law or regulation (Articles 723.6 and 914.4). Second, 
arbitration cases may be heard either by a NAFTA or a GATT panel, at the option of the 
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defending party. Third, NAFTA does not contain an explicit least-trade-restrictive requirement 
for those measures that would fall under the TBT Agreement, which does include such a 
requirement.  
Now consider the case of NAFTA, which created the Commission for Environmental 
Cooperation (CEC) between Canada, Mexico, and the United States. The Statement of 
Administrative Action strengthens regulators under NAFTA in two additional ways. First, it 
explicitly states that the requirement that an SPS measure be “necessary” to achieve its goals is 
not to be interpreted as meaning it must be the least trade restrictive option. Second, the scientific 
basis for setting levels of allowable risk in SPS measures is determined by the regulating 
authority (the defendant), not by a dispute settlement panel (Hufbauer et al. 2000).  
One well-known element of NAFTA runs counter to this tendency. Chapter 11 gives 
firms from one nation the right to initiate disputes against the governments of other nations if the 
firm claims that an investment it made in the other nation has been expropriated. This investor-
state dispute mechanism has no counterpart in the WTO, where an aggrieved private party must 
convince its government to file the dispute on its behalf. Several investors have filed claims with 
NAFTA arbitrators, asserting that regulatory actions that reduced the value of their investments 
constituted a form of expropriation. Mexico has lost one of these cases and partially lost its 
initial appeal to the Supreme Court of British Columbia. Another round of appeals may still 
reverse this decision, but if it stands, it will constitute a distinct and potentially significant 
constraint on regulatory design.  
Based on their concern about transboundary invasions, the Commission for 
Environmental Cooperation (CEC, 2001) recently recommended five priority areas for invasive 
species management within NAFTA. These recommendations were put forth nearly a decade 
after NAFTA was negotiated, and the priority areas seem rather obvious today. Their explicit 
declaration by the CEC, however, makes clear the mounting pressure to address invasives in on-
going NAFTA discussions. First, the CEC requested more science on the identification of 
invasives and their pathways due to trade; second, they asked for a formal centralized network to 
collect and disseminate information about invasives; third, they requested the development and 
distribution of tools to raise awareness and empower decisionmakers interested in control 
invasives; fourth, they want to create a regional directory of legal institutions for all three North 
American countries; and finally, the CEC agreed to identify tools to provide economic incentives 
to engage industrial and commercial sectors. This last point clearly recognizes the public need to 
engage the well-organized private industrial groups that lobby for tighter or looser trade 
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restrictions within NAFTA. The open question we address now is how the private lobbying 
efforts affect the public policy to control invasive species within international trade. 
 
3. A Model 
We consider now our basic model, which extends Grossman and Helpman’s (1994) 
analytical framework that examines the interaction of interest groups and a government that 
cares about general welfare. Their basic model has successfully predicted the structure of 
protection in the United States (Gawande 1997), and Turkey (Mitra, Thomakos et al. 2002). Our 
extension is intended to add the minimal complexity needed to incorporate an externality in trade 
to make as clear as possible what difference this element implies.  
The following process determines lobbyists’ contributions to the government. Before the 
government makes its decision, each organized lobby draws up a contribution schedule. This 
schedule is a perfectly binding agreement that commits the lobbyist to contribute a specific 
amount for every policy choice the government might make. Since we assume no uncertainty 
exists about the price impact of policies, a schedule of contributions as a function of policies is 
equivalent to a function of outcomes—prices (p) and external damage—which is simpler to  
work with. Also, since we assume a tariff is the only tool to address the trade externality, the 
external damage level is fully determined by the import levels, which are fully determined  
by p. This implies we can write the contribution schedule offered by an environmental lobby as 
C(p). For simplicity, assume no environmental lobby exists.2  As in the GH model, the lobbies 
are the private owners of certain specialized factors of production, the rents to which depend on 
prices alone. 
Government cares both about general welfare and about campaign contributions.3 A 
government objective function arises from the desire of political parties to remain in power. 
Consider incumbents who see their reelection probability as greater if society is better off, and 
also as greater if they can spend more on elections. Some may also want social welfare high for 
altruistic or idiosyncratic reasons—but this addition does not make a difference to the theory. 
                                                 
2 See Aidt (1998) for a discussion of how environmental lobbies fit into this framework.  
3 The basic GH model has successfully predicted the structure of protection in the United States (see Goldberg and 
Maggi 1999; Gawand, 1997) and Turkey (see Mitra et al. 2002).   
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What is central to the model is that the relative weight the incumbents place on social welfare 
versus campaign contributions is constant, regardless of the origin of contributions or whether 
increments to social welfare take the form of environmental improvement, a rise in consumer 
surplus, or a rise in government revenue.  
We capture this intuition in a government-objective function  
  




=+ ∑ pp δ m ⋅   (1)   
where p is the price vector; δ is a vector of constant marginal external damage per unit import;  
m is the import vector; Cj  is the contribution to incumbents given by the j
th lobby; a is the 
exogenous weighting of consumer welfare; and L is the set of factors the owners of which have 
successfully organized, also exogenous.4  The government objective function (1) differs from 
GH only by the inclusion of a damage term in the welfare function. 
Adding the environmental externality in trade requires additional assumptions be added 
on the distribution of the externality across citizens. The most reasonable starting point is to 
assume this distribution is equal. For simplicity, assume also the marginal external damage done 
by a unit of import is a vector of constants δ, the i
th element of which is the damage done by 
import of a unit of good i. If good i is exported δi=0, in the case of a consumption-related 
externality. The welfare of the membership is  
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) iii i i i Wp N r s πα α ≡+ + + − ⋅   pp δ mp   ( )
                                                
 (2) 
where  is the total labor income of the group, α i i is the fraction of the population in lobby i,  
the per capita revenue from tariffs (net of payment for export subsidies),  the per 
capita consumer surplus and  the vector of total imports. 
() r p () s p
() mp
Social welfare is  






Wp N r s π
=
=+ + + −   ∑ pp p δ mp  i
 
4 Assumptions of exogeneity and functional form not explicitly discussed are taken from Grossman and Helpman. 
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The sequence of events is (i) lobbies select contribution schedules C(p); and (ii) the 
government, observing those contribution schedules, sets τ to maximize G. This structure is in 
the class of problems known as menu auctions, the general properties of which were examined in 
(Bernheim and Whinston 1986). Two properties matter for our context. First, lobbies are likely 
to exploit truthful strategies: that is, the contribution schedule is such that the lobby is indifferent 
as to which policy ultimately gets chosen among those for which it is willing to make some 
positive contribution. Equivalently, a truthful contribution schedule for lobby i is equal to the 
gross welfare function W
i minus some constant. Bernheim and Whinston show that among the 
possible best responses of any player in any menu auction game, there exists a truthful strategy. 
If any communication among players is possible, equilibria composed of truthful strategies are, 
for practical purposes, the only stable ones. Roughly speaking, nontruthful strategies can be 
undermined by coalitions, even when there is no mechanism available to enforce agreements. 
For this reason, we consider only truthful strategies. 
The second feature is that the Nash equilibrium in a menu auction must maximize the 
joint payoff of the auctioneer (i.e., government) and each bidder (i.e., lobby) given the 
contribution schedules of all other bidders. The parameters underlying the bid functions are 




it maximizes  
  () ( ) ,
e
jj WC G ∆ −+ pp  (4) 
over all p. 
Assuming contribution schedules are differentiable, combine the first order condition for 
maximization of expression (4) with that for maximization of G and sum over the organized 
lobbies to get   





0 i ∆ +∆ =
∂∂ ∑ pp ∀  (5) 
Now invoke several assumptions (see the Appendix for details) used by GH to get 
expressions for the specific factor rents, consumer surplus, supply ( ) jj yp, demand, and 
imports  . Taking the derivative of expression (2) and summing across all the organized 
lobbies shows the first term in (5) to be 
( jj mp )
  ( )() ( )(
i
jL j j L jj j j
iL j




∂ ′ =− + −
∂ ∑  (6) 
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where Ij=1 if the industry has a lobby( ) iL ∈  and zero otherwise. Taking the derivative of 
expression (3) gives 







∂ )    (7) 
Substituting (6) and (7) into (5) gives the equilibrium per unit tariff,  














We see from expression (8) that the tariff always exceeds the marginal damage of the 
import. The last term on the right side of (8) is the same as in the GH model:5 the expression for 
the equilibrium tariff if there is no externality is the difference between the equilibrium and 
optimal tariff when there is an externality. This generalizes the GH idea—political contributions 
induce a gap between equilibrium and optimum. This gap is a logical measure of disguised 
protectionism. 
Perhaps the most important feature of (8) is that the two components of the tariff—
disguised protectionism and internalization of invasives damage—cannot be distinguished 
without knowledge of either the social damage vector δ or the weight the government places on 
public welfare a. In this context, then, there is no way to design trade disciplines that will reduce 
disguised protectionism without nations giving international bodies the right to decide how much 
value should be placed on the public goods endangered by invasive species. It is perhaps 
unnecessary to point out that no such surrender of national sovereignty is contemplated in the 
current round of trade talks.     
 
4. Concluding remarks 
Economists argue that countries should encourage free trade because it allows countries 
to specialize in producing those goods and services in which they have a comparative advantage. 
Trade opens each economy to import goods produced by less expensive means of production 
                                                 
5 GH present the expression for ad valorem tariffs, rather than per unit, so there is no expression identical to the last 
term Error! Reference source not found. in their paper. 
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given basic differences in endowments. Provided property rights are well-defined and enforced, 
free trade is argued to generate more overall welfare in both nations. Invasive species, however, 
are a counterexample against unrestricted free trade. Free trade with exotic hitchhikers might not 
be good for the environment or for the people who depend on the related ecosystem services 
(e.g., zebra mussels in the Great Lakes).  
But public policies to control these invasive species are not immune from political 
pressure from private interest groups. Herein we explore how well-organized interest groups can 
affect a public decisionmaker’s choice of tariff levels to reduce the risk of invasive species. The 
interest group offers up political contributions to an incumbent interested in both the general 
welfare of the public and its own chances of reelection. We find that private political 
contributions cause the regulator to select a tariff level that exceeds the socially optimal level. 
Free trade is too constrained. The invasive-species tariff is set higher than it would be if 
government were independent of rent-seeking contributors. This gap is disguised protectionism 
created by the existence of invasive species. Good intentions aimed at reducing risks to native 
ecosystems from exotic invaders can be leveraged into protectionist policies. The degree to 
which we should be concerned about this protection is the next step in this line of research. 
Measuring empirically the level to which disguised protectionism exists in either the WTO or 
NAFTA seems most worthwhile.   
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Appendix 
The following assumptions are used by us and by GH to simplify calculation of demand 
and supply slopes, bid functions, and so on. There is no specific factor used in production of the 
numeraire good, which is produced by labor alone. All production occurs under constant returns 
to scale, all world prices are exogenous, and it is impossible to alter the world price of the 
numeraire. This means it is also impossible to alter the nominal wage, which by suitable choice 
of units is set to unity. Constant returns and a constant wage means the returns to specific factor i 
depend only on the price of output i; write this as πi(pi)  No citizen owns any of more than one 
specific factor, and within the group of factor owners all are identical. Utility is additively 
separable with strictly concave subutility functions ui, and (without loss of generality) the 
subutility function for the numeraire is linear with unit coefficient 
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where xi is consumption of good i. This assumption adds structure to demand curves and the 
consumer surplus expression. Defining  1/ ( ) ii du x i ′ ≡ , per capita demand is 
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and consumer surplus per capita is  
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From a tariff vector τ (which can include negative elements to represent export subsidies) 
the total revenue per capita is  
  ( ) ( ) rN =⋅ p τ mp
.  
Finally, given the envelope theorem, domestic output of good i is  
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and imports can be written  
  () () N =− md p y p . 
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